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Abstract 
There exists a long-standing debate about the influence of ideology in economics. Surprisingly, 
however, there is no concrete empirical evidence to examine this critical issue. Using an online 
randomized controlled experiment involving economists in 19 countries, we examine the effect of 
ideological bias on views among economists. Participants were asked to evaluate statements from 
prominent economists on different topics, while source attribution for each statement was 
randomized without participants’ knowledge. For each statement, participants either received a 
mainstream source, an ideologically different less-/non-mainstream source, or no source. We find 
that changing source attributions from mainstream to less-/non-mainstream, or removing them, 
significantly reduces economists’ reported agreement with statements. This contradicts the image 
economists have of themselves, with 82% of participants reporting that in evaluating a statement 
one should only pay attention to its content. Using a framework of Bayesian updating we examine 
two competing hypotheses as potential explanations for these results: unbiased Bayesian updating 
versus ideologically-/authority-biased Bayesian updating. While we find no evidence in support 
of unbiased updating, our results are consistent with biased Bayesian updating. More specifically, 
we find that changing/removing sources (1) has no impact on economists’ reported confidence 
with their evaluations; (2) similarly affects experts/non-experts in relevant areas; and (3) has 
substantially different impacts on economists with different political orientations. Finally, we find 
significant heterogeneity in our results by gender, country, PhD completion country, research area, 
and undergraduate major, with patterns consistent with the existence of ideological bias. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“[E]conomists need to be more careful to sort out, for ourselves and 
others, what we really know from our ideological biases.” 
(Alice Rivlin, 1987 American Economic Association presidential address) 
 
One of the dominant views in mainstream (Neoclassical) economics emphasises the 
positivist conception of the discipline and characterizes economists as objective, unbiased, and 
non-ideological. Friedman (1953) describes in his famous essay that “positive economics is, or can 
be, an 'objective' science, in precisely the same sense as any of the physical sciences.”1 Similarly, 
Alchian asserts that “[i]n economics, we have a positive science, one completely devoid of ethics 
or normative propositions or implications. It is as amoral and non-ethical as mathematics, 
chemistry, or physics.”2 Boland (1991) suggests that “[p]ositive economics is now so pervasive 
that every competing view has been virtually eclipsed.” There exists, however, a long-standing 
debate about the role of ideology in economics, which some argue has resulted in rigidity in the 
discipline, rejection and isolation of alternative views, and narrow pedagogy in economic training 
(e.g. Backhouse 2010, Chang 2014, Colander 2005, Dobb 1973, Fine and Mikonakis 2009, 
Fullbrook 2008, Frankfurter and McGoun 1999, Galbraith 1989, Harcourt 1969, Hoover 2003, 
Krugman 2009, Morgan 2015, Robinson 1973, Romer 2015, Rubinstein 2006, Samuels 1992, 
Stiglitz 2002, Thompson 1997, Wiles 1979, and others). 
In this study, we are not directly investigating the credibility of the different arguments 
about the influence of ideological bias in economics by checking the validity of their evidence and 
the consistency of the conclusions drawn. We will instead take an agnostic view on these 
discussions and rather take them as alarming signs that invoke important questions which require 
further investigation. We believe that the answer to whether there is an ideological bias among 
economists has important intellectual implications, both theoretical and practical. Theoretically, it 
will help us investigate the extent to which the theoretical arguments behind the positivist 
methodology of neoclassical economics are consistent with empirical evidence. In terms of 
                                                 
1 Interestingly, Coase (1994) suggests that Friedman’s essay is a normative rather than a positive theory and that “what 
we are given is not a theory of how economists, in fact, choose between competing theories, but [..] how they ought 
to choose.” (see van Dalen (2019) for more details). 
2 Letter from Armen Alchian to Glenn Campbell, January 20, 1969. See Freedman (2016).  
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practical implications, there is growing evidence that suggests value judgments and political 
orientation of economists affect different aspects of their academic life including their research 
(Jelveh et al. 2018, Saint-Paul 2018), citation network (Önder and  Terviö 2015), faculty hiring 
(Terviö 2011), as well as their position on positive and normative issues related to both public 
policy and economic methodology (e.g. Beyer and Pühringer 2019; Fuchs, Krueger and Poterba 
1998; Mayer 2001; van Dalen 2019).  
These results are consistent with the views of some prominent economists who emphasize 
the role of value judgments and ideology in economic analysis. For example, Modigliani (1977: 
10) suggests that “there is no question but that value judgments play a major role in the differences 
between economists. And I think it is unfortunate, but true, that value judgments end up by playing 
a role in your assessment of parameters and of the evidence we consider. […] And there is no 
question that Milton [Friedman] and I, looking at the same evidence, may reach different 
conclusions as to what it means. Because, to him, it is so clear that government intervention is bad 
that there cannot be an occasion where it was good! Whereas, to me, government discretion can 
be good or bad. I'm quite open-minded about that, and am therefore willing to take the point 
estimate. He will not take the point estimate; it will have to be a very biased estimate, before he 
will accept it.” Similarly, Tobin (1976: 336) argues that “[d]istinctively monetary policy 
recommendations stem less from theoretical or even empirical findings than from distinctive value 
judgments.” Therefore, the answer to whether economists are influenced by ideological bias will 
further inform this debate about the various factors underpinning economists’ views and its 
practical implications, which will also inform the discussion about the evolution of the mainstream 
economics discourse and economic training. 
In order to examine the effect of ideological bias on views among economists, we use an 
online randomized controlled experiment involving economists in 19 countries. 3  More 
specifically, we ask participants in our online survey to evaluate statements from prominent 
(mainly mainstream) economists on a wide range of topics (e.g. fairness, inequality, role of 
government, intellectual property, globalization, free market, economic methodology, women in 
economics, etc.). All participants receive identical statements in the same order. However, source 
                                                 
3 By economists we mean those with a graduate degree in economics who are either academics, or work in government 
agencies, independent research institutions, or think tanks. The majority of economists in our sample (around 92%) 
are academics with a PhD degree in economics. See the data section and Table A1 in our online appendix for more 
details. 
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attribution provided for each statement is randomized without participants’ knowledge. For each 
statement, participants randomly receive either a mainstream source (Control Group), a relatively 
less-/non-mainstream source (Treatment 1), or no source attribution at all (Treatment 2).  
We then measure whether economists agree/disagree with identical statements to different 
degrees when statements are attributed to authors who are widely viewed to adhere to different 
views (ideologies), which put them at different distances to mainstream economics, or when no 
source attributions are provided for the statements. Implementing two different treatments 
potentially allows us to distinguish between the influences of ideological bias and authority bias, 
which could lead to similar results. For example, finding an effect only for treatment 2 would be 
consistent with the existence of authority bias but not ideological bias. Similarly, finding an effect 
only for treatment 1 would be in line with the existence of ideological bias but not authority bias. 
Finding an effect for both treatments would be consistent with the existence of both ideological 
bias and authority bias. 
We find clear evidence that changing or removing source attributions significantly affects 
economists’ level of agreement with statements. More specifically, we find that changing source 
attributions from mainstream to less-/non-mainstream on average reduces the agreement level by 
around one-fourth of a standard deviation. These results hold for 12 out of 15 statements evaluated 
by participants, across a wide range of topics and ideological distances between sources. Similarly, 
we find that removing mainstream source attributions on average reduces the agreement level by 
more than one-third of a standard deviation. These result holds for all 15 statements evaluated by 
participants. 
We implement several tests to examine two competing hypotheses as potential 
explanations for our results: unbiased Bayesian updating versus ideologically-/authority-biased 
Bayesian updating (we also develop a model of Bayesian updating in our online appendix that 
further informs the intuition behind these tests in distinguishing between the two hypotheses). 
Under unbiased Bayesian updating, higher level of agreement with statements that are attributed 
to mainstream sources is justified by objective differences in credibility of mainstream sources 
relative to less-/non-mainstream sources. In contrast, under ideologically-biased Bayesian 
updating, economists interpret mainstream sources as more credible, not based on objective 
evaluation but because they are more (less) likely to confirm (disconfirm) their prior views as 
mainstream economists. Similarly, under authority-biased Bayesian updating, while economists 
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might not have any particular priors or ideological views, they are more likely to agree with 
statements attributed to mainstream sources since they are considered as authority figures in the 
profession. Since these different mechanisms are likely to generate similar treatment effects, we 
use our empirical tests to examine their validity. 
While we find no evidence in support of unbiased Bayesian updating, our results are all 
consistent with biased updating among economists. More specifically, and in contrast (consistent) 
with the implications of unbiased (biased) Bayesian updating, discussed in more detail in Section 
5.2, we find that changing/removing sources (1) has no impact on economists’ confidence with 
their evaluations; (2) similarly affects experts/non-experts in relevant sub-fields of economics; and 
(3) has substantially different impacts on economists with different political orientations. 
Moreover, as it is discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.3, differences in our estimated effects of 
treatment 1 and treatment 2, and in their heterogeneity patterns by political orientation, highlight 
the distinct role of both ideological bias and authority bias in influencing views among economists. 
More specifically, we find evidence that suggests the reduction in agreement level caused by 
changing sources (i.e. treatment 1) seems to be mainly driven by ideological bias while the 
reduction in agreement due to removing sources (i.e. treatment 2) seems to be mainly driven by 
authority bias. 
In addition to the aforementioned empirical tests that support the existence of 
ideological/authority bias, participants’ own expressed views on how to evaluate a statement lends 
more credibility to the hypothesis that biased updating is the driving mechanism behind our 
estimated treatment effects. More specifically, in an accompanying questionnaire at the end of the 
survey, a majority of participants (82 percent) report that a statement should be evaluated based 
on its content only, as opposed to its author (0.5 percent), or a combination of both (around 18 
percent), which is in sharp contrast with how they actually evaluate statements. This suggests that 
perhaps part of the ideological/authority bias evident in our results operates through implicit or 
unconscious modes (Bertrand and Duflo 2017).  
We also use background information collected from participants to examine whether our 
results vary systematically by characteristics such as gender, country, area of research, country 
where PhD was completed, and undergraduate major. We find that the estimated ideological bias 
among female economists is around 40 percent less than their male counterparts. Interestingly, on 
one statement in our survey which examines the issue of gender gap in economics, there is a clear 
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and significant disagreement between male and female economists, with women much more 
strongly agreeing with the existence of a serious and persisting gender gap in the discipline. In 
addition, on this specific statement, while men still exhibit strong ideological bias, women display 
no signs of ideological bias. This is perhaps due to the fact that when it comes to the important 
issue of gender gap in economics, which involves female economists at a personal level, women 
put aside ideology and focus on the content of the statement as opposed to its source. 
We also find systematic and significant heterogeneity in ideological bias by country, area 
of research, country where PhD was completed, and undergraduate major, with some groups of 
economists exhibiting no ideological bias and some others showing very strong bias. In addition, 
the heterogeneity patterns found in our results remain consistent with the existence of ideological 
bias. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
discussion about economics and ideology. Section 3 describes our experimental design. Section 4 
discusses our data and empirical methodology. Section 5 presents and discusses our results. 
Section 6 concludes.  
2. Economics and Ideology: a Brief Overview  
Our hypothesis regarding the potential influence of ideological bias among economists is 
rooted in a long-standing debate about the influence of ideology in economics. Therefore, a better 
understanding of this literature will better inform our analysis and the interpretation of any results 
associated with ideological bias. Milberg (1998) elegantly summarizes the long-standing debate 
about the influence of ideology in economics by stating that “the history of economic thought can 
in fact be read as a series of efforts to distance knowledge claims from the taint of ideology, a 
continuing struggle to establish the field’s scientific merit.”  
About a century ago, Irving Fisher, in his presidential address to the American Economic 
Association, raised his concern about ideological bias in economics by stating that, “academic 
economists, from their very open-mindedness, are apt to be carried off, unawares, by the bias of 
the community in which they live.” (Fisher 1919). Other prominent economists such as Joseph 
Schumpeter and George Stigler also made substantial contributions to this discussion over the next 
few decades (see Schumpeter (1949) and Stigler (1959, 1960, 1965) for examples). However, the 
change in the nature of economic discourse, the increasing use of mathematics and statistics, and 
the increasing dominance of the positivist methodology, represented by Friedman’s “Methodology 
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of Positive Economics”, have reduced the concern with ideological bias in economics, which has 
gradually given way to a consensus that “economics is, or can be, an objective science.”4  
Due to this prevailing consensus, the issue of ideological bias has been largely ignored 
within mainstream economics in the last few decades. Critics, however, argue that the increasing 
reliance of economics on mathematics and statistics has not freed the discipline from ideological 
bias; it has simply made it easier to disregard it (e.g. Myrdal 1954, Lawson 2012).  
There also exists evidence that could suggest that economics has not successfully rid itself 
of ideological bias. For example, Hodgson and Jiang (2007) argue that due to ideological bias in 
economics, the study of corruption has been mainly limited to the public sector, when there is 
abundant evidence of corruption in the private sector (sometimes in its relation to the public sector 
but also internally). Jelveh et al. (2018) point to ideological overtones that could be identified in 
public debates between prominent economists over public policy during the last financial crisis as 
an example of ideological bias in economics. They also point out that these perceptions of 
ideological bias among economists have even affected the selection of economists as experts for 
different government positions.5 Yet another example could be found in a 2006 interview with 
David Card by the Minneapolis Fed.6 Talking about his decision to stay away from the minimum 
wage literature after his earlier work on the topic, which according to the article “generated 
considerable controversy for its conclusion that raising the minimum wage would have a minor 
impact on employment,” he laments that one of the reasons was that “it cost me a lot of friends. 
People that I had known for many years, for instance, some of the ones I met at my first job at the 
University of Chicago, became very angry or disappointed. They thought that in publishing our 
work we were being traitors to the cause of economics as a whole.”  
Other prominent manifestations of ideological bias in economics include the so-called 
fresh-water/salt-water divide in macroeconomics (Gordon and Dahl 2013) and its impact on 
citation networks (Önder and Terviö 2015) as well as faculty hiring (Terviö 2011), the conflicts 
                                                 
4 See Friedman (1953). 
5 They point out to the following two examples: “The rejection of Peter Diamond, a Nobel laureate in economics, by 
Senate Republicans, as the nominee to the Federal Reserve Board, with one of the top Republicans on the Banking 
Committee calling him “an old-fashioned, big government, Keynesian” at the nomination hearing (see here). And, the 
withdrawal of Larry Summers from his candidacy for the chairmanship of the Federal Reserve Board due to strong 
opposition from a coalition group over several issues related to ideology, including his role to “push to deregulate 
Wall Street”” (see here). 
6 Interview with David Card, by Douglas Clement, The Region, Minneapolis Fed, December 2006 (Interview: October 
17, 2006). 
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between liberal/conservative camps in economics (especially regarding the possible distribution-
efficiency trade-off), the Borjas versus Card debate on immigration, and the ideologically charged 
debates over the controversial book by Thomas Piketty (2014) or over Paul Romer (2015) and his 
criticism that “mathiness lets academic politics masquerade as science.” Finally, recent results 
from the Professional Climate Survey conducted by the American Economic Association also 
highlight some of the challenges in the profession that are potentially driven by ideological bias. 
For example, 58% of economists feel that they are not included intellectually within the field of 
economics.7 In addition, 25% of economists report that they have been discriminated against or 
treated unfairly due to their research topics or political views.  
There also exists a long-standing charge laid mainly by non-neoclassical economists 
regarding the prevalence of ideological bias among neoclassical economists (e.g. Backhouse 2010, 
Fine and Milonakis 2009, Fullbrook 2008, Frankfurter and McGoun 1999, Morgan 2015, Samuels 
1992, Thompson 1997, Wiles 1979). For example, summarizing the views of the Post-Autistic 
economics movement in France, Fullbrook (2003) argues that the economic profession is the 
“opposite of pluralistic” and is “dogmatically tied to value-laden neoclassical orthodoxy.” Samuels 
(1980) suggests that economics is much more a “system of belief than it is a corpus of verified 
logical positivist knowledge” and that many uses of economics “may represent only the clothing 
of normativism with the garments of science”. Rothbarb (1960) criticizes what Hayek calls 
‘scientism” in economics and argues that it is a “profoundly unscientific attempt to transfer 
uncritically the methodology of the physical sciences to the study of human action.” McCloskey 
(2017) asserts that economics has “deliberately clad itself in a garb of positivism, even when 
scholars knew the critical importance of the historical, social, and political embeddedness of their 
interventions.” 
There are also studies that point to the ideological biases in economic training. Based on a 
survey of graduate students in economics, Colander (2005) raises concerns regarding how graduate 
training in economics may lead to biases in students’ views. For example, he argues that graduate 
training in economics induces conservative political beliefs in students. Allgood et al. (2012) also 
find evidence that suggests that “undergraduate coursework in economics is strongly associated 
with political party affiliation and with donations to candidates or parties”. Using laboratory 
experiments, other studies find that compared to various other disciplines, economics students are 
                                                 
7 AEA Professional Climate Survey: Main Findings. Released on March 18, 2019.  
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more likely to be selfish (Frank et al. 1993 and 1996, Frey et al. 1993, Rubinstein 2006), free-
riding (Marwell and Ames 1981), greedy (Want et al. 2012), and corrupt (Frank and Schulze 2000). 
Frey et al. (1993) attribute these results to the economic training which “neglects topics 
beyond Pareto efficiency […] even when trade-offs between efficiency and ethical values are 
obvious.”  Frank et al. (1993) highlight the exposure of students to the self-interest model in 
economics where “motives other than self-interest are peripheral to the main thrust of human 
endeavor, and we indulge them at our peril.” Rubinstein (2006) argues that “students who come to 
us to 'study economics' instead become experts in mathematical manipulation” and that “their 
views on economic issues are influenced by the way we teach, perhaps without them even 
realising.”  Stiglitz (2002) also argues that “[economics as taught] in America’s graduate schools 
… bears testimony to a triumph of ideology over science.”  
Surprisingly, however, there is very thin empirical evidence to rule out or establish the 
existence of ideological views among economists. We are only aware of few studies that examine 
this issue to some extent. Gordon and Dahl (2013) use data from a series of questions from the 
IGM Economic Expert Panel to examine to what extent prominent economists (51 economists) 
from the top seven economics departments disagree about key economic issues. Their results 
suggest that “there is close to full consensus among these panel members when the past economic 
literature on the question is large. When past evidence is less extensive, differences in opinions do 
show up.”8 They also find that “there is no evidence to support a conservative versus liberal divide 
among these panel members, at least on the types of questions included so far in the surveys.”9  
Van Gunten, Martin, and Teplitskiy (2016) suggest that Gordon’s and Dahl’s focus on 
testing factionalism, which reduces the social structure of the discipline to discrete and mutually 
exclusive group memberships, is a poor model for economics. They instead suggest an alignment 
model according to which “the field is neither polarized nor fully unified but rather partially 
structured around the ‘state versus market’ ideological divide.” They use principle component 
analysis to reanalyze the data used by Gordon and Dahl (2013) and find that, in contrast to their 
                                                 
8 The variable that measures the size of the economic literature related to a certain question is constructed based on 
judgment calls by Gordon and Dahl (2013). 
9 They use two approaches here. First, they use different distance-based clustering methods to examine whether panel 
members are clustered into “two or even a few roughly equal-sized camps” based on their responses. As their second 
approach, they identify a subset of questions that are likely to generate disagreement among panel members, and then 
classify answers to these questions as either consistent with “Chicago price theory” or consistent with concerns 
regarding distributional implications or market failures. They then test whether participants’ responses are 
homogenous as a panel or are divided into two groups. They find evidence that supports the former. 
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findings, there exists a “latent ideological dimension clearly related to contemporary political 
debates and, more importantly, show that ideological distance between economists is related to 
partisan and departmental affiliations—as well as to the similarity of respondents’ informal social 
networks.” They argue that “our results suggest that paradigmatic consensus does not eliminate 
ideological heterogeneity in the case of the economics profession. Although there is indeed 
substantial consensus in the profession, we show that consensus and ideological alignment are not 
mutually exclusive.” Finally, they suggest that “one implication of our findings is that consumers 
of economic expertise must exercise healthy skepticism faced with the claim that professional 
opinion is free of political ideology.” 
Jelveh et al. (2018) use purely inductive methods in natural language processing and 
machine learning to examine the relationship between political ideology and economic research.  
More specifically, using the member directory of the AEA, they identify the political ideology (i.e. 
Republican versus Democrat) of a subset of these economists by (fuzzily) matching their 
information to publicly disclosed campaign contribution and petition signings (35 petitions). Next, 
using the set of JSTOR and NBER papers written by these economists with an identified political 
ideology, they estimate the relationship between ideology and word choice to predict the ideology 
of other economists.10 Finally, examining the correlation between authors’ predicted ideology and 
their characteristics, they find that predicted ideology is “robustly correlated with field of 
specialization as well as various department characteristics.” They suggest that results are 
suggestive of “substantial ideological sorting across fields and departments in economics.” 
Van Dalen (2019) uses an online survey of Dutch economists to examine the effect of 
personal values of economists on (1) their positive or normative economic views; (2) their attitudes 
towards scientific working principles; and (3) their assessment of assumptions in understanding 
modern-day society. To measure the personal values of economists, he uses 15 questions “as 
formulated in the European Social Survey (2014) and in some cases the World Values Survey 
(2012)” and employs factor analysis to summarize the results into three dominant categories: 
achievement and power, conformity, and public interest. He finds a significant variation in 
opinions and a clear lack of consensus among economists when it comes to their views of both 
                                                 
10 These estimates are relied on the strong assumption that the relationship between word choice and ideology is the 
same among economists whose political ideology is identified through their campaign contributions and petition 
signings and those whose political ideology is unidentified.  
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positive and normative economic issues as well as their views regarding scientific working 
principles in economics and their adherence to specific assumptions in economic theory. He also 
finds clear evidence that personal values of economists have significant impacts on their views 
and judgments in all these three areas. 
Finally, Beyer and Pühringer (2019) use petitions signed by economists as an indicator for 
ideological preferences to analyze the social structure of the population of politically engaged 
economists and to uncover potentially hidden political cleavages. Their sample includes 14,979 
signatures from 6,458 signatories using 68 public policy petitions, addressing a wide range of 
public policy issues, and 9 presidential anti-/endorsement letters from 2008 to 2017 in the US. 
They find “a very strong ideological division among politically engaged economists in the US, 
which mirrors the cleavage within the US political system” with three distinct clusters: a non-
partisan (13 petitions), a conservative (27 petitions), and a liberal cluster (37 petitions). Estimating 
the closeness centrality and the clustering coefficients of the petitions, they also find that while 
petitions on some public policy issues (e.g. benefits of immigration, preserving charitable 
deductions, etc.) exhibit non-partisan status, others on issues such as tax policy, labour market 
policy and public spending exhibit strong partisan status. Moreover, analyzing the network 
structure of 41 fiscal policy petitions, they find evidence of a strong ideological divide among 
economists. They conclude that their results “support the hypothesis that political preferences also 
imprint on economic expert discourses.” 
3. Experimental Design 
It is well understood that examining issues such as the impact of bias, prejudice, or 
discrimination on individual views and decisions is very challenging, given the complex nature of 
these types of behaviour. For example, the issue of discrimination in the labour market has long 
been an issue of importance and interest to labour economists. However, as Bertrand and Duflo 
(2017) put it, “it has proven elusive to produce convincing evidence of discrimination using 
standard regression analysis methods and observational data.” This has given rise to a field 
experimentation literature in economics that has relied on the use of deception, for example 
through sending out fictitious resumes and applications, to examine the prevalence and 
consequences of discrimination against different groups in the labour market (see Bertrand and 
Duflo (2017) and Riach and Rich (2002) for a review. Also see Currie et al. (2014) as another 
example of experimental audit studies with deception). 
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Given that answering our question of interest is subjected to the same challenges, we take 
a similar approach, namely using fictitious source attributions, in order to produce reliable results 
(See Section 4 in our online appendix for a more detailed discussion on the use of deception in 
economics). More specifically, we employ a randomized controlled experiment embedded in an 
online survey. Participants are asked to evaluate a series of statements presented to them by 
choosing one of the following options: strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, and strongly 
disagree. They are also asked to choose a confidence level on a scale from 1 to 5 for their selected 
answer. These statements are on a wide range of topics in economics and while they are mainly 
from prominent (mainstream) economists, most of them challenge, to different extents, certain 
aspects of mainstream economics discourse. 
Our choice of critical statements, as opposed to neutral or supportive statements such as 
those in the IGM Expert Panel analyzed by Gordon and Dahl (2013), is based on the idea that 
ideological reactions are more likely to be invoked, especially through changing sources, when 
one encounters views that are in contrast to his views/ideologies. Changing sources on views that 
one agrees with are less likely to induce an ideological reaction. Van Gunten, Martin, and 
Teplistkiy (2016) also emphasize this issue by arguing that the IGM Expert Panel survey is not 
designed to elicit ideology and “includes many didactic items that illustrate the implications of 
textbook economics, such as the benefits of free trade (3/13/12), the impossibility of predicting the 
stock market (10/31/2011), the disadvantages of the gold standard (1/12/12) and the state-
controlled Cuban economy (5/15/12), and the proposition that vaccine refusal imposes 
externalities (3/10/2015). Although these items usefully illustrate mainstream professional opinion 
on particular issues, for the purposes of strictly testing the hypothesis of aggregate consensus, these 
‘softball’ items have dubious value, because few observers doubt that there is a consensus on such 
issues within this mainstream. Had the survey included ‘heterodox’ or ‘Austrian’ economists, it 
may have encountered a wider range of opinion.” 
Another issue to highlight is that most of our statements are not clear-cut one-dimensional 
statements. Given the complex nature of ideological bias, it is more likely to arise, or to be revealed 
by individuals, in situations where the issues discussed are more dense, complex and multi-
dimensional. This is partly due to the fact that ideological arguments are more easily concealed 
when it comes to more complex multi-dimensional issues.  
12 
 
All participants in our survey receive identical statements in the same order. However, 
source attribution for each statement is randomized without participants’ knowledge.11 For each 
statement, participants randomly receive either a mainstream source (Control Group), or a 
relatively less-/non-mainstream source (Treatment 1), or no source attribution (Treatment 2).12 See 
Table A8 in our online appendix for a complete list of statements and sources. 
Participants who are randomized into treatment 2 for the first statement remain there for 
the entire survey. However, those who are randomized into control group or treatment 1 are 
subsequently re-randomized into one of these two groups for each following statement. Moreover, 
those randomized into treatment 2 were clearly informed, before starting to evaluate the 
statements, that “All the statements that you are going to evaluate are made by scholars in 
economics, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the researchers. We have not provided the 
actual sources of these statements to make sure they are evaluated based on their content only.” 
Three points are worth highlighting here. First, the actual and the altered sources for each 
statement were carefully paired such that they can be associated to commonly known but different 
views (such as different schools of thoughts, political leanings, disciplines, attitudes towards 
mainstream economics, etc.), so that there is an ideological distance between them and switching 
the source can potentially induce an ideological bias. We refrain from interpreting the ideological 
contours of each source, given the obvious complexities involved. Instead we simply use these 
sources and their commonly known views as a probe to measure potential ideological reactions to 
them. In addition, for each source, we also provide information on their discipline, their affiliation, 
and the title of one of their publications. This is to further accentuate the ideological differences 
between the two sources for each statement, especially in cases where sources might be less known 
                                                 
11 For the most part, the randomization was done across countries. Participants got randomized into different groups 
upon visiting the online survey. Since in most cases the survey was run concurrently in different countries, this led to 
randomization of subjects across countries. 
12 We are aware that in economics the notions of mainstream and less-/non-mainstream has changed a lot over time. 
Similar to many other classifications, this is simply an attempt to summarize a complex notion and provide an easy-
to-understand relative comparison, even though we believe these differences between mainstream and less-/non-
mainstream economics are more appropriately understood as a continuum rather than a dichotomy. For the lack of 
better classifications, therefore, we categorize our sources into these two groups to clearly summarize and represent 
the relative ideological distance between them. Of course, it is well-understood that this classification does not readily 
apply to some sources, such as older ones (e.g. Karl Marx) or sources from other disciplines (e.g. Michael Sandel or 
Sigmund Freud) in the same way as it applies to others. However, to remain consistent and avoid confusion for the 
reader, we stick to the same naming convention for all sources. 
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by economists.13 Second, statements were carefully selected so that their attribution to fictitious 
sources is believable by participants. Third, all selected statements were relatively obscure so the 
misattribution would not be easily noticed by participants.14  
4. Data 
The target population for this study were economists from 19 different countries.15 We 
used Economics Departments, Institutes and Research Centers in the World (EDIRC) website, 
which is provided by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, to identify 
economic institutions (economics departments, government agencies, independent research 
institutions, and think tanks) in each target country. We then used the website of each institution 
(provided on the EDIRC website) to manually extract the email addresses of economists in each 
institution. The extracted email addresses were then used to send out invitations and reminders to 
ask economists to participate in the survey. The survey was conducted between October 2017 and 
April 2018. While the survey’s exact opening and closing dates were different for some countries, 
the survey was open in each country for approximately two months. 
In many cases during email extraction, especially in the case of multidisciplinary 
departments (e.g. school of business, management, and economics), research institutions, and 
government agencies, it was not clear from the institution’s website which listed faculty members 
or researchers were economists and which ones held a degree from other disciplines. In these cases, 
we asked our team of research assistants to extract all listed email addresses. Our rationale was 
that sending email invitations to some non-economists was clearly better than risking to exclude 
some economists, especially since this exclusion could be systemically related to the type of 
                                                 
13 For example, while some economists might not know Richard Wolff or Anwar Shaikh, knowing that they are 
affiliated with the University of Massachusetts Amherst or the New School for Social Research, the two famous 
heterodox schools in economics, makes it more likely to induce an ideological reaction. Similarly, titles of selected 
publication for each source, such as “Rethinking Marxism”, “The Crisis of Vision in Modern Economic Thought”, or 
“What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets”, serve the same purpose.  
14 We received less than a dozen emails from people who had recognized the misattribution of a statement to a source. 
In all but one of these cases, the statement identified as being misattributed was statement 13 (see Table A8 in the 
online appendix), which is perhaps the least obscure statement used in our survey. This statement is from Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations, which was misattributed to Karl Marx. All the emails we received, however, made it clear 
that this was perceived as a mistake in our survey and not part of our survey design. Nevertheless, identifying 
misattributions, which seems to be quite rare based on emails we received, would only lead to an underestimation of 
the true bias effect. It is very hard to imagine people exhibiting stronger ideological bias if they find out about the 
fictitious sources and the true objective of the survey.  
15 These countries include Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US. The entire 
(English) survey was translated into French, Italian, Japanese and Brazilian Portuguese to allow participants from 
corresponding countries to complete the survey in their own native language if they choose to.  
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institution and lead to sample selection. We made sure however that non-economists who received 
the survey invitation were self-filtered out by making it clear in our email invitation as well as on 
the first page of the survey that the target population of the survey are economists.16 
As a result, we are not able to provide a reliable estimate of the participation rate in our 
survey since that would require the total number of economists in the target population, which is 
considerably smaller than the total number of email addresses we extracted online, for the reason 
discussed above. In addition, this calculation is further complicated by the fact that upon sending 
email invitations we received a considerable number of auto-replies from people who had left their 
institution, were on sabbatical, parental, or sick leave, or temporarily had no access to their email. 
With these in mind, a very rough estimate of the participation rate in our survey is around 15%.17 
Although we cannot measure a reliable participation rate for our survey for the reasons discussed 
above, our summary statistics (Table A1 in our online appendix) suggest that we have a very 
diverse group of economists in our final sample. We have also reported the distribution of 
responses by institution of affiliation in the US, Canada, and the UK in figures A3 to A5 in our 
online appendix as examples to show that participants in our survey come from a very diverse 
group of institutions in each country and are not limited to certain types of institutions. 
Participants in our survey were required to complete each page in order to proceed to the 
next page. As a result, they could not skip evaluating some statements. However, participation in 
the survey was entirely voluntary and participants could choose to withdraw at any point during 
the survey, without providing any reason, by simply closing the window or quitting the browser. 
Participants were assured that any responses collected up until the point of withdrawal will not be 
included in the study. For this reason, we are not allowed, by the terms of our ethics approval, to 
use data collected from people who did not complete the entire survey. As a result, we have 
restricted our sample to participants who completed the entire survey.18 Our final sample includes 
2,425 economists from 19 different countries. We run several tests to ensure that our focus on 
                                                 
16 As expected, we received many emails from faculty members who were not economists (historians, statisticians, 
sociologists, political scientists, engineers, etc.) asking us to remove them from the email list.  
17 This estimate was obtained by simply dividing the number of participants by the total number of emails addresses 
without excluding non-economists or those with their emails set to auto-reply. It therefore underestimates the true 
participation rate in our survey. 
18A total of 3,288 economists participated in our survey. There were 454 participants who quit the survey at the very 
beginning (in the questionnaire section where they were asked to provide background information). Another 409 
people withdrew from the survey at some point after they started evaluating the statements. See Table A3 in our online 
appendix for more details. 
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participants who completed the entire survey does not introduce sample selection bias in our results 
and we find no evidence of such a bias. See Section 2 in our online appendix for more details. 
The primary dependent variable in our analysis is the reported agreement level with each 
statement. In our baseline analysis, we estimate linear regression models in which the agreement 
variable is coded as 1 for “strongly disagree”, 2 for “disagree”, 3 for “neutral”, 4 for “agree”, and 
5 for “strongly agree”. We also estimate ordered logit models for robustness check. The agreement 
level of participant 𝑖 with statement 𝑗 is represented by the variable 𝑦𝑖𝑗 and is modeled as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝑆1𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾2𝑆2𝑖𝑗 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗,   (1) 
where 𝑆1𝑖𝑗 and 𝑆2𝑖𝑗  are indicators that are equal to one if for statement 𝑗 participant 𝑖 received a 
less-/none-mainstream source, or no source, respectively. The estimated coefficients of interest are 
𝛾1 and 𝛾2  and measure average difference in agreement level between those who randomly 
received a less-/non-mainstream source or no source, respectively, compared to those who 
received a mainstream source. We also include several individual-level control variables (𝑋𝑖) in 
some of our specifications.19 However, if our randomization is carried out properly, including 
these control variables should not affect our results (and as reported later on we find that they 
don’t). 
5. Results 
5.1. Main Findings  
Figure 1 displays the probability of different agreement levels for each statement as well 
as their relative entropy index which measures the comparative degree of consensus with each 
statement. The relative entropy index is derived from information theory and has a theoretical 
range of 0 for perfect consensus and 1 for no consensus at all.20 Results reported in Figure 1 suggest 
that there is a significant dissensus on the wide variety of issues evaluated by economists. Despite 
this consistent pattern of dissensus, there exists some variation across statements in the relative 
entropy index with economists exhibiting the highest degree of consensus on statements 8 and 1 
                                                 
19 Our primary control variables include: gender, PhD completion cohort (15 categories), Current Status (8 categories), 
Country (19 categories), Research Area (18 categories). Additional control variables used in some specifications 
include age cohort (13 categories), country/region of birth (17 categories), English proficiency (5 categories), 
department of affiliation (8 categories), country/region where PhD was completed (16 categories). See Table A1 in 
the online appendix for more detail on different categories. 
20 The entropy index is given by ∑−𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑖 , where 𝑝𝑖  is the observed relative frequencies for our five response 
categories. The relative entropy index is then calculated by dividing the entropy index by the maximum possible 
entropy (i.e. 𝑝𝑖 = 0.2). 
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and the lowest degree of consensus on statements 12, 9, 6, 5 and 11. We find similar patterns if we 
restrict the sample to economists who only received mainstream sources or no sources. As we 
discussed before, our statements either deal with different elements of the mainstream economics 
paradigm, including its methodology, assumptions, and the sociology of the profession (e.g. 
Statements 3, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15), or issues related to economic policy (e.g. Statements 1, 2, 4, 5, 10). 
Therefore, the significant disagreement evident in Figure 1 highlights the lack of both paradigmatic 
and policy consensus among economists on evaluated issues.  
These results stand in sharp contrast with Gordon and Dahl (2013) who find strong 
consensus among their distinguished panel of economists on different policy-oriented economic 
questions from IGM Expert Panel survey. One potential explanation for this stark difference coud 
be the critical nature of our statements, as well as the fact that they are not clear-cut and one-
dimensional.21 However, several other studies that use positive and clear-cut statements on both 
public policy and economic methodology issues also find results that do not support the strong 
consensus found by Gordon and Dahl (2013) and exhibit patterns of dissensus that are more similar 
to our findings (e.g. Beyer and Pühringer 2019, Fuchs 1996; Frey et al. 1984, Fuchs, Krueger and 
Poterba 1998; Mayer 2001; van Dalen 2019; Whaples 2009). Van Gunten et al. (2013) suggest 
that the strong consensus found by Gordon and Dahl might be driven by what they refer to as 
“softball questions”.22 Consistent with this idea, Wolfers (2013) also suggests that rather than 
testing the professional consensus among economists, “a founding idea of the IGM Expert Panel 
seems to be to showcase the consensus among economists.” It is also important to note that Gordon 
and Dahl (2013) use a very small and a highly-selective sample of economists which is a serious 
limitation for the purpose of demonstrating consensus among economists (Van Gunten, Martin, 
and Teplistkiy 2016).  
Table 1 displays the results from linear models that estimate how these agreement levels 
are influenced by our two treatments. Column (1) uses a simplified model with no additional 
control variables, while columns (2) to (4) add personal and job characteristics as well as individual 
fixed effects.23 We find clear evidence that changing source attributions from mainstream to less-
                                                 
21 As we explained in Section 3, our choice of these types of statements was intentional, since they leave more room 
for individuals to reveal their disagreements through the influence of their biases. 
22 Van Gunten et al. (2016) note that “overall, on 30 percent of [IGM Expert Panel] items, not a single respondent 
took a position opposite the modal view (i.e., agreed when the modal position was disagree or vice versa).” 
23 Refer to Table A2 in our online appendix for estimated coefficients of our control variables. 
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/non-mainstream significantly reduces the agreement level by 0.26 points. This is around one-
fourth of a standard deviation or a 7.3 percent reduction in an average agreement level of 3.6 in 
our control group. Our results also suggest that removing mainstream sources (i.e. providing no 
source) also significantly reduces the agreement level by 0.41 points (an 1l.3 percent reduction 
which is equal to 35% of a standard deviation).  
As estimates reported in Columns (2), (3), and (4) suggest, controlling for different 
individual characteristics and individual fixed effects does not change our results, which provides 
further support that our randomization protocol was implemented properly. In addition, results 
from our specification with individual fixed effects suggests that our estimate of treatment 1 is 
unlikely to suffer from sample selection bias due to non-random attrition across treatment groups. 
Finally, as the results reported in Table A11 in our online appendix suggest, estimating the same 
specifications while clustering the standard errors at the individual level does not have any 
appreciable impact on our results. More specifically, clustering has virtually no impact on standard 
errors for treatment 1, while slightly increasing standard errors for treatment 2.24 However, the t-
statistics for estimates of treatment 2 are so large (around 27 before clustering) that this slight 
increase has virtually no impact on the outcomes of our hypothesis testing. 
While OLS estimates are perhaps easier to summarize and report, given the discrete 
ordered nature of our dependent variable, a more appropriate model to use in this context is an 
ordered logit model. Another advantage of using ordered logit is that it allows us to examine 
whether our treatments have heterogeneous effects. More specifically, changing a source from 
mainstream to less-/non-mainstream might have opposite effects on those who (strongly) 
agree/(strongly) disagree with a statement. For example, on the one hand, those who strongly agree 
with a statement that is critical of mainstream economics are more likely to be less-/non-
mainstream, and therefore treatment 1 might induce higher agreement among them. On the other 
hand, those who strongly disagree with the same statement are more likely to be mainstream, and 
therefore treatment 1 might induce higher disagreement among them. 25  These potential 
heterogeneous effects will not be captured by our OLS model.  
                                                 
24 These changes are consistent with Abedie et al (2017) who suggest clustering is relevant “when clusters of units, 
rather than units, are assigned to a treatment.” 
25 This potential heterogeneous effect might also be responsible for the larger effect estimated for treatment 2. For 
example, providing a less-/non-mainstream source might generate biases in two directions, with the positive effect on 
agreement partially canceling out the negative effect. Removing the source however might only introduce a negative 
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Table 2 reports the estimates from our ordered logit model. Overall, we find results similar 
to those reported in Table 1 using OLS.26 We find that changing sources from mainstream to less-
/non-mainstream, or to no source, significantly increases (decreases) the probability of 
disagreement (agreement) with statements. More specifically, we find that providing a less-/non-
mainstream source on average increases the probability of “strong disagreement” by 2.2 
percentage points or 44 percent, increases the probability of “disagreement” by 5 percentage points 
or 30 percent, increases the probability of reporting “neutral” by 2.1 percentage points or 12.6 
percent, reduces the probability of “agreement” by 3.6 percentage points or 9 percent, and reduces 
the probability of “strong agreement” by 5.7 percentage points or 27 percent. This suggests that 
regardless of the extent to which participants agree or disagree with a statement when the attributed 
source is mainstream, changing the source to less-/non-mainstream significantly decreases 
(increases) their agreement (disagreement) level. In addition, while the effect of treatment 1 on 
increasing the probability of (strong) disagreement is larger relative to its impact on reducing the 
probability of (strong) agreement, we find no evidence of opposite treatment effects. 
 Moreover, similar to our linear estimates, we also find larger effects in the same direction 
when no sources are provided for the statements. Also, in line with our linear estimates, we get 
almost identical results when we include control variables in our specification. Several other 
robustness checks performed (see Section 3 in our online appendix) also fully confirm the 
robustness of our results.   
5.2. Ideological/Authority Bias or Unbiased Bayesian Updating? 
As our results clearly suggest, the significant reduction in agreement level we find is 
distinctly driven by changing the source attributions, which influences the way economists 
perceive the statements. However, one could argue that these results might not be necessarily 
driven by ideological bias induced by attributed sources and the extent to which their views are 
aligned with mainstream economics. Therefore, in order to organize and examine different 
potential explanations for our results, we use Bayesian updating as a guiding framework that fits 
reasonably well with different elements of our experiment. 
                                                 
effect. As a result, our treatment 2 will have a larger effect than treatment 1. Ordered logit model will allow us to 
examine this possibility as well. 
26 We also estimate multinomial logit models for robustness check. Results from these models are very similar to those 
from ordered logit models.  
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More specifically, our experiment involves evaluating statements in an environment with 
imperfect information about the validity of the statements. This imperfect information could be 
due to not having enough knowledge about the subject, lack of conclusive empirical evidence, the 
statements being open to interpretation, etc.. Bayesian updating models suggest that in such an 
environment with imperfect information, individuals make judgement using a set of prior beliefs 
that are updated using Bayes’ rule as new information arrives. In the context of our study, this 
translates into prior beliefs held by economists on each statement’s validity, which is then updated 
using a signal they receive regarding the validity of the statement in form of an attributed source.  
It is important to note however that the process of updating the priors could be both biased 
or unbiased. Bayes’ Theorem does not say anything about how one should interpret the signals 
received in the process of updating priors and therefore does not preclude the influence of cognitive 
biases or ideological biases in interpreting signals and updating priors (Gerber & Green 1999, 
Bartels 2002, Bullock 2009, MacCoun & Paletz 2009, Fryer et al. 2017). Unbiased Bayesian 
updating requires the processing of information to be independent from one’s priors (Fischle 2000, 
Taber and Lodge 2006, Bullock 2009). In contrast, under ideologically-biased Bayesian updating, 
one selectively assigns more weight to information that is more likely to confirm one’s ideological 
views (Bartels 2002, Taber and Lodge 2006, Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006).  
In the context of our study, lower agreement level associated with less-/non-mainstream 
sources could be attributed to unbiased Bayesian updating under the assumption that mainstream 
sources systematically provide objectively more credible signals regarding the validity of the 
statements compared to less-/non-mainstream sources. Alternatively, mainstream sources could be 
perceived as more credible not based on objective evaluation unrelated to priors, but rather based 
on the fact that mainstream sources are more likely to confirm a mainstream economist’s views 
and values. The distinction with unbiased updating therefore is that this interpretation is not made 
objectively and independent from prior beliefs, but that it is made based on the fact that mainstream 
(less-/non-mainstream) sources are more likely to confirm (disconfirm) mainstream views.  
There exists extensive evidence that suggests individuals tend to agree more with findings 
or views that are more (less) likely to confirm (disconfirm) their beliefs (e.g. McCoun 1998, Gerber 
and Green 1999, Bartels 2002, Bullock 2009, Hart et al. 2009, MacCoun and Paletz 2009, Fryer et 
al. 2017, and others). This is broadly referred to as the confirmation bias. Beliefs that one seeks to 
confirm have different natures and could be formed by ingrained, ideological or emotionally 
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charged views. If beliefs that an individual is trying to confirm or validate are shaped by her 
ideological views, we are dealing with what is often referred to as ideological bias.27  
For example, MacCoun and Paletz (2009) conducted an experiment to examine how 
ordinary citizens evaluate hypothetical research findings on controversial topics. They find that, 
when findings challenge their prior beliefs, people are more skeptical of the findings. Their results 
also suggest that “citizens, especially those holding conservative beliefs, tended to attribute studies 
with liberal findings to the liberalism of the researcher, but citizens were less likely to attribute 
conservative findings to the conservatism of the researcher.” They interpret this as effects of 
“partisanship and ideology”.  
Determining whether less/non-mainstream sources are more or less objectively credible 
than mainstream sources is of course extremely difficult since both groups include individuals who 
are prominent scholars in their fields with views that put them at different distances, sometimes 
relatively close and sometimes rather far, to mainstream economics. Therefore, one main problem 
with unbiased Bayesian updating as a potential explanation is that there are no objective measures 
that could be used to assess the credibility of our sources. Any claims of systematic differences 
between these sources in terms of credibility is inevitably based on subjective metrics that correlate 
with where one stands relative to mainstream views and its academic norms. It is exactly for this 
reason that traditional norms of modern science suggest that any serious evaluation of an argument 
should be based on the content of the argument as opposed to the source attributed to it (Merton 
1973, McCoun 1998).  
In fact, economists in our sample strongly agree with this view. More specifically, as part 
of the questionnaire that appears at the end of the survey, we ask participants to express their own 
views regarding several issues including how they believe “a claim or argument should be 
rejected?” A strong majority of participants (around 82%) report that “a claim or argument should 
be rejected only on the basis of the substance of the argument itself.” Around 18% of participants 
report that “a claim or argument should be rejected based on what we know about the views of the 
author or the person presenting the argument as well as the substance of the argument.” There 
                                                 
27 As Eagleton (1991) suggests, the term “ideology” has been used in different ways by different social scientists. This 
is partly due to the complex and multi-dimensional nature of the concept, which does not yield itself very easily to a 
neat definition. We therefore see little advantage in providing a narrow definition by singling out one trait among a 
complex of traits. It is the complex itself that we are interested in, and in this paper, we examine a clearly-defined 
manifestation of this complex notion. 
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exists only a tiny minority (around 0.5%) who report “a claim or argument should be rejected 
based on what we know about the views of the author or the person presenting the argument.”28 
Despite the aforementioned issue related to unbiased Bayesian updating as a potential 
explanation, we nevertheless propose three empirical tests that would allow us to examine the 
validity of biased versus unbiased updating. See Section 1 in our online appendix for a Bayesian 
updating model we developed to more formally inform these empirical tests.  
5.2.1. Test 1: Differences in Confidence Level 
As our first test, we examine how changing or removing attributed sources influences the 
participants’ reported level of confidence in their evaluations. More specifically, we estimate 
models similar to those reported in Table 1 but instead use as our dependent variable the level of 
confidence reported for one’s evaluation of a statement (on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being least 
confident and 5 being most confident).29 If economists agree more with statements attributed to 
mainstream sources because mainstream sources are objectively more credible/reliable, then this 
higher degree of credibility should also inspire more confidence in the evaluation of statements 
attributed to mainstream sources. In the language of Bayesian updating, assuming that mainstream 
sources are objectively more credible would mean that they are also considered more likely to be 
unbiased and more precise.30 It therefore follows that the precision of the posterior beliefs, proxied 
by reported confidence, will be higher when signals are considered more precise (more credible).31   
As the results reported in Table 3 suggest, however, altering or removing source 
attributions does not influence participants’ confidence in their evaluations (the estimated 
coefficients are quantitatively very small and statistically insignificant).32 These results therefore 
are in contrast with unbiased updating, which is expected to be associated with higher confidence 
                                                 
28 We also examine differences in our estimated treatment effects between those who claim statements should be 
evaluated only based on their content versus those who claim both the content and the views of the author matter. We 
find almost identical estimates for treatment 1 (-0.22 versus -0.20) and treatment 2 (-0.34 versus -0.35) for both groups. 
This suggests that our results are not driven by one of these two group. 
29 See Figure A6 in our online appendix for the probability of different confidence levels by statement. 
30 While unbiasedness and precision are two separate concepts from a statistical point of view, the two concepts are 
likely to be inter-related in the context of our study. It seems reasonable to consider the perception regarding a source’s 
degree of unbiasedness to also affect the perception regarding source’s degree of precision. For example, if a source 
is considered to be biased to some extent, it is hard to know the exact degree of bias to subtract it from the signal in 
order to achieve an unbiased signal to use to update priors. Therefore, not knowing the exact level of bias is likely to 
affect the perception regarding the source’s level of precision with more biased sources being considered less precise.   
31 See Implication 1 of the Bayesian updating model developed in Section 1 of the online appendix for a formal proof. 
32 Results from ordered logit (not reported here) also suggest that our treatments have no impact on confidence level. 
Our estimated differences in predicted probabilities are all small and statistically insignificant for all five categories.  
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in evaluations when statements are attributed to mainstream sources. They are consistent, however, 
with ideologically-/authority-biased updating that could affect the level of agreement with little or 
no impact on confidence level. For example, an ideologically-biased individual is likely to put the 
same level of confidence in accepting a story if it comes from the Fox News and in rejecting the 
same story if it comes from the New York Times. That is, ideological bias affects one’s judgement 
often without casting doubt on one’s confidence with the judgement. 
5.2.2. Test 2: Differences Between Experts and Non-Experts 
As our second test, we examine whether our estimated treatment effects are different 
among experts and non-experts. It is reasonable to assume that experts have more precise priors 
regarding the validity of a statement that is in their area of expertise. Therefore, compared to non-
experts who are engaged in unbiased updating, experts should rely more heavily on their own 
priors and less on the signals to inform their evaluation. As a result, changing the signal from 
mainstream to less-/non-mainstream is expected to have a smaller effect on experts relative to non-
experts under unbiased updating.33 In contrast, under ideologically-biased updating, mainstream 
experts’ stronger views on a subject, and/or their higher ability at interpreting how mainstream or 
non-mainstream a source is, could create a stronger bias in favour of mainstream sources among 
experts. Therefore, in contrast to unbiased updating, which results in smaller treatment effects for 
experts, under biased updating the combination of the two opposing forces (i.e. more precise priors 
which give rise to smaller treatment effects, and stronger mainstream biases which produces larger 
treatment effects) could result in similar or larger treatment effects among experts compared to 
non-experts. 
We create an indicator that is equal to 1 if a participant’s reported area of research is more 
likely to be relevant to the area of an evaluated statement and zero otherwise (see Table A10 in 
our online appendix for more details). If our categorization reasonably separates experts from non-
experts, one would expect that, conditional on the level of agreement, those categorized as experts 
will be one average more confident with their evaluation, especially when the source is 
mainstream. We find this to be true in our sample, where, conditional on agreement level and other 
characteristics, experts in the control group are 5% of a standard deviation more confident with 
their evaluation compared to non-experts. 
                                                 
33 See Implication 2 of the Bayesian updating model in Section 1 of the online appendix for a formal proof. 
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Next, we estimate linear models similar to those reported in Table 1 where we allow our 
treatment effects to vary between experts and non-experts. Results from this model are reported in 
Table 4. First, and conditional on observed characteristics, we find no difference in average 
agreement level between experts and non-experts in the control group. In other words, one’s 
expertise in the subject area does not affect one's evaluation of a statement when sources are 
mainstream. Second, we find that both treatments similarly reduce the agreement level among 
experts and non-experts. These findings are therefore inconsistent with unbiased updating which 
suggests higher level of expertise is expected to result in smaller treatment effects. However, they 
are consistent with biased updating which could result in similar treatment effects between experts 
and non-experts as discussed above.  
One could argue however that, apart from the precision of the priors and stronger biases, 
experts and non-experts may also systematically differ along other dimensions, which would make 
the interpretation of the above results more complicated. For example, those categorized as experts 
might have a different likelihood to be mainstream, which could in turn induce different treatment 
effects, or their priors may be more centered giving them more space to update up or down. To 
address these potential caveats, we perform two robustness checks. First, we run linear models 
similar to those reported in Table 4 where we add a rich set of controls for participants’ political 
orientation and political/economic typology to control for their likelihood to be mainstream. More 
specifically, we add to our list of control variables a set of twenty indicators based on participants’ 
self-reported political orientation on a scale from -10 (far left) to 10 (far right). At the end of the 
survey, participants were also asked to read a series of binary statements and for each pair pick the 
one that comes closest to their view (see Table A9 in our online appendix for a list of these 
statements). We also include a set of indicators based on answers to these questions to control for 
participants’ political and economic typology.  
Results from these regressions are reported in Table A12 in our online appendix. We find 
that, even after including this extensive set of controls, there are still no differences in estimated 
treatment effects between experts and non-experts. This suggests that the similarity in treatment 
effects between the two groups is unlikely to be driven by differences in their likelihood of being 
mainstream. In addition, we also estimate an ordered logit model to compare differences in 
probability of different agreement levels between experts and non-experts. These results are 
reported in Figure A7 in our online appendix. We find that the distribution of responses is almost 
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identical between experts and non-experts in all three groups (i.e. control group, treatment 1, 
treatment 2). This rejects the idea that experts might have more centered priors. 
5.2.3. Test 3: Differences by Political Orientation 
As our third and perhaps most important test, we examine whether our estimated treatment 
effects vary across different groups with different political orientations. If the reduction in 
agreement level associated with changes in sources is based on objective differences in credibility 
of the sources, by definition this objective difference should not depend on one’s political views. 
As a result, our estimates should not vary systematically by political orientation under unbiased 
updating. In fact, if anything, those on the right should be less affected by changing the source 
attributions since they are significantly more likely to report that a statement should be evaluated 
based on its content only. More specifically, among those at the far right, 86.7 percent of 
participants report that in evaluating a statement only its content matters, while 13.3 percent report 
that both content and author matter. In contrast, among those at the far left, these numbers are 73.8 
percent and 25.1 percent, respectively.  
In contrast, evidence suggesting that the effect of treatment 1 varies systematically by 
political orientation is consistent with ideological bias. More specifically, our less-/non-
mainstream sources often represent views or ideologies that are (politically) to the left of 
mainstream sources. Therefore, if our results are driven by ideological bias, reduction in agreement 
level should be larger among those more to the right of the political spectrum since altering the 
sources creates a larger contrast with their prior beliefs which will in turn induce a larger 
ideological reaction among this group.34  
We estimate linear models similar to Equation (1) above where we allow the effect of each 
treatment to vary by political orientation. Political orientation is reported by participants on a scale 
from -10 (far left) to 10 (far right). We use the reported values to group people into 5 categories.35 
Results from this model are reported in the first three columns of Table 5. Estimates reported in 
Column (1) suggest that there exists a very significant difference in the average agreement level 
with statements among economists with different political orientations, even when the sources are 
all mainstream. For example, the average agreement level among economists categorized as left 
                                                 
34 See Implication 3 of the Bayesian updating model in Section 1 of the online appendix for a more formal treatment 
of this proposition. 
35 Far left = [-10 -7], Left = [-6  -2], Centre = [-1  1], Right = [2  6], Far Right = [7  10]. 
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is one-fourth of a standard deviation lower than those categorized as far left. This already large 
difference increases consistently as we move to the far right, reaching a difference of 0.60 points 
of a standard deviation, which is an increase of 150 percent. This strong effect of political 
orientation on economists’ evaluation of our statements, which does not change after controlling 
for a wide set of observed characteristics, seems to be a clear manifestation of ideological bias. 
These results are also consistent with other studies that suggest economists with different political 
leanings adhere to different views regarding different economic issues and policies (Beyer and 
Pühringer 2019; Horowitz and Hughes 2018; Mayer 2001) 
Estimates reported in Column (2) suggest an even more drastic difference by political 
orientation which further reinforces the influence of ideological bias. More specifically, for those 
on the far left, altering the source only reduces the average agreement level by 0.046 points of a 
standard deviation, which is less than one-fourth of the overall effect we reported in Table 1 (0.22 
points). However, moving from the far left to the far right of the political orientation distribution 
consistently and significantly increases this effect, with the effect of altering the source being 
almost 7 times (678 percent) larger at the far right compared to the far left (-0.36 versus -0.046, 
respectively). We reject the null hypothesis that the effect at the far left (left) is equal to the effect 
at the far right at 0.1% (5%) confidence level. We also reject the null that the effects are equal 
across all five groups (F-statistic = 17.27) or across all four groups excluding far left (F-statistic = 
3.12).  
Our estimates reported in Column (3) suggest that for every given category of political 
orientation, removing the sources has a larger effect on reducing the agreement level compared to 
altering the sources, which is consistent with our previous results. However, while the estimated 
effect of treatment 1 consistently and very significantly increases as we move to the far right, we 
fail to reject the null that the estimated effect of treatment 2 is similar across all five groups.  
The lack of difference in the estimated effect of treatment 2 by political orientation could 
be due to the fact that removing the source induces what is known as authority bias. Authority bias 
is the tendency to assign more credibility to views that are attributed to an authority figure 
(Milgram 1963). Under ideological bias, individuals’ interpretation of the signals and their level 
of agreement with statements are influenced by their ideological views, including their political 
orientation/ideology. Therefore, as discussed before, the significant effect of political orientation 
on the estimated effect of treatment 1 is consistent with the existence of ideological bias. In 
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contrast, under authority bias, it is the presence/absence of an authority figure that affects 
individuals’ interpretation of signals and agreement level, while they might not hold any particular 
ideological views on the subject or their perception of authority. 36  This implies that, under 
authority bias, political orientation does not necessarily influence the agreement level, which is 
consistent with out estimated effect of treatment 2.  
Given that we found a robust and significant estimated effect for both treatment 1 and 
treatment 2, up until this point, we could not rule out that both ideological bias and authority bias 
contribute to each treatment effect. However, we find that the estimated effect of treatment 2 does 
not follow the same meaningful pattern by political orientation as treatment 1. This is consistent 
with the aforementioned distinction between ideological and authority biases. This suggests that 
there are important differences in underlying forces driving our estimated effects of treatment 1 
and treatment 2, with the former (latter) more likely to be driven by ideological (authority) bias.  
We also perform a couple of robustness checks. As estimates reported in columns (4) to 
(6) of Table 5 suggest, our results remain the same if we categorize people based on quintiles of 
the political orientation distribution. Moreover, including additional control variables do not affect 
our results.37  
It is reasonable to argue, however, that the self-reported measure of political orientation 
used to categorize people depends on political environments and contexts that could vary 
significantly from one country to another. For example, someone who is considered a centrist or 
centre-right in the UK could perhaps be categorized as left in the US. This could complicate the 
interpretation of our results. To address this issue, we use participants’ answers to a series of 
questions at the end of our survey that are designed to identify their political and economic 
typology.38 More specifically, we regress our self-reported political orientation measure on a series 
of indicators created based on answers to these questions. We then use predicted values from this 
regression to categorize people into five groups based on its distribution quintiles. Results reported 
                                                 
36 From a theoretical perspective, the main distinction we draw between ideological bias and authority bias is that, 
under ideological bias, individuals are more likely to agree with views that confirm their own ideological views. 
However, under authority bias, individuals are more likely to agree with views that are attributed to an authority figure 
regardless of their own ideological position. For example, authority bias will result in higher admiration for a poem if 
it is attributed to a famous poet, but lower admiration if it is attributed to a school teacher, with neither of the two 
assessments influenced by ideology. 
37 These results are not reported here, but are available upon request. 
38 Participants were asked to read a series of binary statements and for each pair pick the one that comes closest to 
their view. See Table A9 in our online appendix for a list of these statements. 
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in Columns (7) to (9) of Table 4 are based on this alternative categorization and remain similar to 
those reported in other columns confirming the same patterns. 
5.2.4. Addressing Two Potential Caveats 
In this section, we address two potential caveats regarding the validity of 
ideological/authority bias as an explanation for our results. First, it can be argued that, given the 
low stake nature of our survey, economists did not have the incentive to exert much effort and read 
each statement carefully. Therefore, when the attributed source for a statement was a prominent 
mainstream economist who they recognized and trusted as a scholar, they glossed over the 
statement and relied on the source for their evaluation. As a result, statements attributed to 
mainstream sources received a higher level of agreement.  
If this hypothesis is valid, then one of its implications is that participants in our control 
group should have spent less time completing the survey compared to those in the two treatment 
groups. However, our estimates reported in Table A5 in our online appendix suggest that there are 
no differences in average survey completion time between control group and treatment 1. We find, 
however, that those randomized into treatment group 2 on average took less time to complete the 
survey, but the estimated difference is very small (less than a minute) and is to be expected since 
people in this group had less text to read, given that there were no source attributions provided.  
Consistent with these results, our estimates in Table A6 in our online appendix suggest that 
restricting our sample to individuals with different survey completion times (a potential proxy for 
different levels of effort exerted to read the statements) also has no impact on our results. Finally, 
this hypothesis fails to explain the findings from our three tests above, especially why agreement 
level is strongly influenced by political orientation (Test 3).  
The second potential caveat we would like to address is that we have not established 
whether our participants have in fact been able to identify the ideological distance between sources, 
and therefore ideological bias might not be a valid explanation. If this is the case, then one needs 
to put forward an alternative explanation that explains why changing sources systematically 
reduces the agreement level, and why this effect changes significantly by political orientation. We 
cannot think of a plausible alternative hypothesis that is able to explain all or even most of our 
results. More importantly, we believe it is quite reasonable to expect from those with reasonable 
knowledge about economics, which we assume economists possess, to be able to identify the 
ideological distance between sources such as Marx versus Smith, Mill versus Engels, Summers 
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versus Varoufakis, Keynes versus Arrow, Fisher versus Galbraith, and others. In addition, as we 
mentioned in Section 3, we also provided information on the sources’ discipline, their affiliation, 
and the title of one of their publications, to further accentuate the ideological differences between 
each pair of sources.39 Finally, As our results in Section 5.4.1. suggest, we find similar treatment 
effects when we examine statements individually. Therefore, unless one is ready to claim that 
economists in our sample could not identify differences in views/ideologies between sources in 
any of the statements, which we suggest is a very unreasonable claim, it is hard to argue that our 
estimated treatment effects are not driven by ideological/authority bias. 
Altogether, our results presented and discussed above are consistent with the existence of 
ideological and authority biases in views among economists and are in contrast with the 
implications of unbiased Bayesian updating. We would like to emphasize that, while some of our 
results might be considered (at least by some of our readers) as more compelling than others, it is 
the entirety of the body of evidence we have provided that should be considered when one ponders 
the validity of these two competing hypotheses (i.e. biased versus unbiased updating), or other 
potential hypotheses. This is of course consistent with the methodology of modern economics, that 
the relative superiority of a hypothesis, relative to other alternative hypotheses, is determined by 
its relative degree of success in explaining the observed patterns. Therefore, to suggest that 
ideological/authority bias is not driving our results, one needs to posit an alternative hypothesis 
that is on average more successful in explaining all the observed patterns, and not only a cherry-
picked few.  
5.3. Statistical Power and Reproducibility of Findings 
A growing body of literature is raising concern regarding the dominant practice in 
empirical studies to restrict attention to type-I-error and highlights the importance of statistical 
power as a critical parameter in evaluating the scientific value of empirical findings (see Maniadis 
and Tufano (2017) for a review). This is especially important since there is growing evidence that 
suggests empirical findings in economics, and several other disciplines, are significantly 
underpowered. For example, assessing more than 6,700 empirical studies in economics, Ioannidis 
                                                 
39 For example, while some economists might not know sources such as Richard Wolff, William Milberg, Steve Keen, 
or Anwar Shaikh, either their affiliation (e.g. The New School for Social Research, UMass Amherst), or the title of 
their books (e.g. The Crisis of Vision in Modern Economic Thought, Rethinking Marxism, What Money Can't Buy: 
The Moral Limits of Markets, Debunking economics: the naked emperor dethroned?, Capitalism: Competition, 
conflict, Crises), or their discipline (e.g. political philosophy, sociology, psychology) highlights their distance with 
mainstream economics. 
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et al. (2017) find that “half of the areas of economics research assessed have nearly 90% of their 
results under-powered. The median statistical power is 18%, or less.” As Maniadis and Tufano 
(2017) suggest, “an important implication of the overall inadequate power of empirical research 
in economics is that a sizable majority of its studies have less than 50% probability of detecting 
the phenomenon under investigation.”  
Following List et al. (2011) and Maniadis et al. (2017), we calculate the optimal sample 
size for our control and treatment groups that allows us to calculate a minimum economically 
relevant treatment effect at what is considered a reasonable significance level (α=0.05) and 
statistical power (1-β=0.80) in the literature (e.g. List et al. 2011, Ioannidis et al. 2017). We find 
that for a given statement, in order to find a treatment effect equal to 15% of a standard deviation, 
which we consider an economically relevant treatment effect in our study, we need to have 
approximately 800 participants in each group, which is the number of participants we actually 
have. This suggests that, given our sample size, the treatment effects we have estimated for each 
individual statement meet a high standard in terms of statistical power and degree of 
reproducibility. Doing the same exercise for our analysis of all statements combined, which is most 
of our analysis, suggests that our sample size of 36,375 individual-statements allows us to find a 
treatment effect as small as 6% of a standard deviation at α=0.01 and 1-β=0.99. 
Another important and related question raised by Maniadis et al. (2017) is that, “given 
publication of a newly discovered finding, how much confidence should we have that it is true?” 
Maniadis et al. (2014) propose a measure of post-study probability (PSP) that allows one to 
measure “the probability that a declaration of research finding, made upon reaching statistical 
significance, is true.” As Maniadis et al. (2014) show, the value of PSP depends on significance 
level α, statistical power β, and priors about the true probability of association between two 
phenomena, π. In the context of our study, π translates into priors regarding the probability that 
the existence of ideological bias among economists is a true phenomenon. We consider a low, a 
medium, and a high prior to measure how much these priors should change in light of our results. 
We use β=0.99 and α=0.01 which we showed above are reasonable numbers given our sample size 
and estimated effects when all statements are combined. 
We find that, if one holds a prior that there is only a 10% probability that the existence of 
ideological bias among economists is a true phenomenon (π=0.1), then the probability that our 
estimated treatment effects are true is PSP=91.6%. This probability is 99% and 99.8%, for π=0.5 
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and π=0.9, respectively. This suggests significant updating in those prior beliefs in light of our 
results.40  
5.4. Heterogeneity Analysis 
In this section, we examine how our estimated treatments vary by statement as well as by 
different characteristics including gender, country of residence, country where PhD was 
completed, undergraduate major, and main research area. It is interesting and important to 
understand how the biases we have found in our analysis vary across different groups. This could 
help to shed more light on some of the factors underlying ideological/authority bias. As it is 
discussed in more detail in the next section, we find evidence of significant and systematic 
heterogeneity in our estimated treatment effects. Consistent with our previous results, we cannot 
square these findings with unbiased Bayesian updating since we cannot think of compelling 
reasons to explain why unbiased updating will lead to systematically different treatment effects 
for people from a certain gender, country, or research area. However, as we discuss in more detail 
in the following section, these differences by personal characteristics remain consistent with the 
existence of ideological/authority bias among economists.  
We continue to use OLS to estimate treatment effects since its estimates are easier to 
summarize and present, and since they are similar to estimates from ordered logit models as 
discussed before.   
5.4.1. Heterogeneity by Statement 
First, we investigate the effect of our two treatments on agreement level separately for each 
statement. These results are summarized in Figure 2. Consistent with our overall findings, we find 
that for all but three statements, changing source attributions to a less-/non-mainstream source 
significantly reduces the agreement level. The estimated reductions range from around one-tenth 
of a standard deviation to around half of a standard deviation. Interestingly, we find that the largest 
reduction in agreement level for treatment 1 occurs for Statement 6, which is arguably the 
statement that is most critical of mainstream economics and its methods, and also brings up the 
issue of ideological bias in mainstream economics.41 This again is consistent with ideological bias 
                                                 
40 Even for a prior of 1%, the PSP = 50%.  
41 The statement reads: “Economic discourse of any sort - verbal, mathematical, econometric-is rhetoric; that is, an 
effort to persuade. None of these discursive forms should necessarily be privileged over the others unless it is agreed 
by the community of scholars to be more compelling. Only when economists move away from the pursuit of universal 
knowledge of 'the economy' and towards an acceptance of the necessity of vision and the historical and spatial 
contingency of knowledge will the concern over ideological 'bias' begin to fade. Such a turn would have important 
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where views that are more likely to disconfirm previously held beliefs are more strongly 
discounted when the source is less-/non-mainstream.  
Regarding the three statements with no reduction in agreement level (i.e. statements 1, 3, 
and 7), one potential explanation is that the ideological distance between the sources for each 
statement is not large enough to induce ideological bias. Taking a closer look at the sources for 
each statement seems to suggest that this is indeed a plausible explanation. The sources for these 
statements are Dani Rodrick vs. Paul Krugman, Hayek vs. Freud, and Irving Fisher vs. Kenneth 
Galbraith. Interestingly and consistent with authority bias, we find that, for the same three 
statements, removing the source attribution significantly reduces the agreement level, highlighting 
again the difference in driving forces behind the estimated effects of treatment 1 and treatment 2.  
Results displayed in the right panel of Figure 2 suggest that removing the source 
attributions significantly reduces the agreement level for all 15 statements. Similar to our results 
reported in Table 1, the estimated effects of treatment 2 are larger than treatment 1 in almost all of 
the statements. Results reported in Figure 2 also suggest that it is not just extreme differences in 
views (e.g. Smith vs. Marx) that invoke ideological bias among economists. Even smaller 
ideological differences (e.g. Deaton vs. Piketty or Sen vs. Sandel) seem to invoke strong 
ideological reactions by economists.  
5.4.2. Heterogeneity by Gender 
Next, we examine gender differences in our estimated treatment effects. These results are 
reported in Table 6 and suggest that on average female economists who are randomized into 
control group agree more with our statements compared to their male counterparts in the control 
group. The estimated difference in agreement level is around 6 percent of a standard deviation. In 
addition, we find that the estimated ideological bias is 44% larger among male economists as 
compared to their female counterparts (24% of a standard deviation reduction in agreement level 
versus 14%, respectively), a difference that is statistically significant at 0.1%. These results are 
consistent with studies from psychology which suggest that women exhibit less confirmation bias 
than men (Meyers-Levy 1986, Bar-Tal and Jarymowicz 2010). Gordon and Dahl (2013) also find 
evidence that suggests that male economists are less cautious in expressing an opinion. This seems 
                                                 
implications for economic method as well, as knowledge claims would increasingly find support, not in models of 
constrained optimization, but with such techniques as case studies and historical analyses of social institutions and 
politics. Increasing reliance of economics on mathematics and statistics has not freed the discipline from ideological 
bias, it has simply made it easier to disregard.” 
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to be consistent with stronger ideological bias among male economists found in our results, since 
ideological bias and assigning higher levels of certainly to our own views usually work hand in 
hand. Finally, these results are consistent with van Dalen (2019) who finds that female economists 
are more likely to believe that economic research is not affected by one’s political views, perhaps 
because they more strongly aspire to be less ideologically biased. 
We find, however, that the gender difference in authority bias is much smaller (34% of a 
standard deviation reduction for males versus 35% for females) and statistically insignificant. In 
other words, removing mainstream sources seems to affect men and women in similar ways. These 
results hold even after including our extensive set of indicators for political orientation and 
political/economic typology to control for potential gender differences. We also find similar results 
when we estimate gender differences in treatment effects separately for each statement. In 9 out of 
15 statements, the estimated ideological bias is larger for men than for women, while the results 
are more mixed for our estimates of authority bias (see Figure A2 in our online appendix).  
We would like, however, to highlight the estimated gender difference in ideological bias 
for Statement 5, which involves the issue of gender gap in economics.42 Overall, and without 
considering group assignment, there exists a very large difference in the level of agreement with 
this statement between male and female economists. More specifically, conditional on observed 
characteristics, the average agreement level among male economists is 0.78 points lower than 
female economists, a very large difference that is around 2/3rd of a standard deviation and 
statistically significant at the 0.1% confidence level. Taking group assignment into account, female 
economists who randomly receive Carmen Reinhart as the statement source (i.e. control group) 
report an agreement level that is on average 0.73 points higher compared to their male counterparts 
in the control group. Moreover, while switching the source from Carmen Reinhart to the left-wing 
economist/sociologist Diane Elson does not affect the agreement level among female economists 
(estimated effect is 0.006 points), it significantly decreases the agreement level among male 
economists by 0.175 points (around 15% of a standard deviation). It seems that when it comes to 
                                                 
42 The statement reads: “Unlike most other science and social science disciplines, economics has made little progress 
in closing its gender gap over the last several decades. Given the field’s prominence in determining public policy, this 
is a serious issue. Whether explicit or more subtle, intentional or not, the hurdles that women face in economics are 
very real.” The actual (mainstream) source of the statement is Carmen Reinhart, Professor of the International 
Financial System at Harvard Kennedy School and the author of This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial 
Folly (2011). The altered (less-/non-mainstream) source of the statement is Diane Elson, British Economist and 
Sociologist, Professor Emerita at the University of Essex, and the author of Male bias in the development process 
(1995). 
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the important issue of the gender gap in economics, which involves female economists at a 
personal level, women put aside ideology and merely focus on the content of the statement as 
opposed to its source.  
These results also highlight a large divide between male and female economists in their 
perception and concerns regarding the gender gap in economics.43 This is of critical importance 
since the discussion around the gender problem in economics has recently taken the centre stage. 
During the recent 2019 AEA meeting, and in one of the main panel discussions titled “how can 
economics solve its gender problem?”, several top female economists talked about their own 
struggles with the gender problem in economics. In another panel discussion, Ben Bernanke, the 
current president of the AEA, suggested that the discipline has “unfortunately, a reputation for 
hostility toward women….”44 This is following the appointment of an Ad Hoc Committee by the 
Executive Committee of the AEA in April 2018 to explore “issues faced by women […] to improve 
the professional climate for women and members of underrepresented groups.” 45  AEA also 
conducted a climate survey recently to “provide more comprehensive information on the extent 
and nature of these [gender] issues.” It is well-understood that approaching and solving the gender 
problem in economics first requires a similar understanding of the problem by both men and 
women. However, our results suggest that there exists a very significant divide between male and 
female economists in their recognition of the problem.   
5.4.3. Heterogeneity by Country of Residence/PhD Completion 
Next, we examine how our estimated effects vary by country of residence. These results 
are reported in Table 7. Estimates reported in Column (1) suggest that even when sources are 
mainstream, and conditional on observed characteristics, there are significant differences in 
average agreement level by country (we reject the null of equality at 0.1%). On one side, we have 
economists in South Africa, France and Italy who hold the highest level of agreement with the 
statements when sources are mainstream, while on the other side we have economists in Austria 
and the US who hold the highest level of disagreement. These results are consistent with Frey et 
al. (1984) who also find significant differences across five countries in views among economists. 
                                                 
43 Gender differences in perception of gender discrimination is not limited to economics and has been documented in 
other studies and in various contexts (e.g. Fisman and O’neill 2008, Miller and Katz 2018, Raggins et al. 1998). 
44 Reported in a New York Times article titled “Female Economists Push Their Field Toward a #MeToo Reckoning”, 
published on January 10, 2019. 
45 American Economic Association, Ad Hoc Committee on the Professional Climate in Economics, Interim Report, 
April 6, 2018. 
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Similarly, and for both treatments, we find that the estimated effects vary significantly across 
countries, ranging from around half of a standard deviation to zero. We also reject the null that the 
estimated effects of treatment 1/treatment 2 are the same across countries at the 0.1% confidence 
level. More specifically, we find that economists in Austria, Brazil, and Italy exhibit the smallest 
ideological bias (for Brazil and Austria, the estimated effects are also statistically insignificant). 
On the other side of the spectrum we find that economists in Ireland, Japan, Australia, and 
Scandinavia exhibit the largest ideological bias. Economists in countries such as Canada, the UK, 
France, and the US stand in the middle in terms of the magnitude of the estimated ideological bias. 
In addition, when we examine the effect of authority bias, these countries maintain their positions 
in the distribution, although the estimated effects of authority bias remain larger than the estimated 
effects of ideological bias for most of the countries.  
Table 8 reports results that examine heterogeneity by country/region where PhD was 
completed. We find that economists who completed their PhD in Asia, Canada, Scandinavia, and 
the US exhibit the strongest ideological bias, ranging from 39% to 25% of a standard deviation. 
On the opposite end we find that economists with PhD degrees from South America, Africa, Italy, 
Spain, and Portugal exhibit the smallest ideological bias (statistically insignificant for South 
America and Africa). These results are somewhat consistent with those reported in Table 7 and 
suggest that some of the countries where economists exhibit the largest/smallest ideological bias 
are also those that induce strongest/weakest ideological bias in their PhD students (e.g. Brazil, 
Italy, Scandinavia). In addition, we find that our estimated effects of authority bias, while larger 
in size, largely follow the same patterns as our estimates of ideological bias. 
5.4.4. Heterogeneity by Area of Research 
In Table 9 we take up the issue of heterogeneity by the main area of research. Results 
reported in Column (1) suggest that similar to previous heterogeneity patterns, and conditional on 
observed characteristics, there are significant differences in agreement level among economists 
from different research areas, even when attributed sources are all mainstream. Estimates reported 
in Columns (2) and (3) suggest that economists whose main area of research is history of thought, 
methodology, heterodox approaches; cultural economics, economic sociology, economic 
anthropology; or business administration, marketing, accounting exhibit the smallest ideological 
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and authority bias. 46  We find however that economists whose main area of research is 
macroeconomics, public economics, international economics, and financial economics are among 
those with the largest ideological bias, ranging from 33% to 26% of a standard deviation.  
Another interesting point to highlight is that, while for economists in all research areas the 
estimated effect of ideological bias is smaller or similar than the estimated effect of authority bias, 
macroeconomists are the only group for whom the estimated ideological bias is significantly larger 
than the estimated authority bias (1/3rd versus 1/5th of a standard deviation). This is potentially 
driven by the fact that our less-/non-mainstream sources induce a stronger reaction in 
macroeconomists than when we remove the sources altogether.  
5.4.5 Heterogeneity by Undergraduate Major   
Lastly, we examine heterogeneity by undergraduate major. As we discussed before, there 
exists growing evidence that suggests economic training, either directly or indirectly, could induce 
ideological views in students (e.g. Allgood et al. 2012, Colander and Klamer 1987, Colander 2005, 
Rubinstein 2006). Consistent with these studies, we find that economists whose undergraduate 
major was economics or business/management exhibit the strongest ideological bias (1/4th of a 
standard deviation). However, we find that economists with an undergraduate major in law; 
history, language, and literature; or anthropology, sociology, psychology, exhibit the smallest 
ideological bias (statistically insignificant in all three cases).47  
6. Conclusion 
We use an online randomized controlled experiment involving economists in 19 countries 
to examine the influence of ideological and authority bias on views among economists. Economists 
who participated in our survey were asked to evaluate statements from prominent economists on 
different topics. However, source attribution for each statement was randomized without 
participants’ knowledge. For each statement, participants either received a mainstream source, a 
less-/non-mainstream source, or no source. We find that economists’ reported level of agreement 
with statements is significantly lower when statements are randomly attributed to less-/non-
mainstream sources who hold widely-known views or ideologies that put them at different 
distances to mainstream economics, even when this distance is relatively small. In addition, we 
                                                 
46 For the latter group, this could be driven by lack of familiarity with where different sources stand in relation to 
mainstream economics and their ideology. 
47 Of course, this systematic difference could be driven by self-selection of individuals into different undergraduate 
majors and is not necessarily causal.  
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find that removing the source attribution also significantly reduces the agreement level with 
statements.  
We use a Bayesian updating framework to organize and test the validity of two competing 
hypotheses as potential explanations for our results: unbiased Bayesian updating versus 
ideologically-/authority-biased Bayesian updating. While we find no evidence in support of 
unbiased Bayesian updating, our results are all consistent with the existence of biased updating. 
More specifically, and in contrast (consistent) with implications of unbiased (biased) Bayesian 
updating, we find that changing/removing sources (1) has no impact on economists’ precision of 
their posterior beliefs (proxied for by economists’ reported level of confidence with their 
evaluations); (2) similarly affects experts/non-experts in relevant areas; and (3) changes strongly 
and systematically by economists’ political orientation. We also find systematic and significant 
heterogeneity in our estimates of ideological/authority bias by gender, country, country/region 
where PhD was completed, area of research, and undergraduate major with patterns consistent 
with ideological/authority bias.  
Scholars hold different views on whether economics can be a ‘science’ in the strict sense 
and free from ideological underpinnings. However, perhaps one point of consensus is that the type 
of ideological bias that could result in endorsing or denouncing an argument on the basis of its 
author’s views rather than its substance, is unhealthy and in conflict with scientific tenor and the 
subject’s scientific aspiration, especially when the knowledge regarding rejected views is limited. 
It is hard to imagine that these biased reactions only emerge in a low-stake environment, such as 
our experiment, without spilling over to other areas of academic life. After all, a strong majority 
of experimental studies in economics and other disciplines are based on low-stake experiments, 
but we rarely discount the importance of their findings and their implications based on the low-
stake nature of the experiments. Moreover, there exists growing evidence that suggests that 
political leanings and value judgments of economists influence different aspects of their academic 
life such as economic research (Jelveh et al. 2018, Saint-Paul 2018), citation networks (Önder and  
Terviö 2015), faculty hiring (Terviö 2011), and public policy support (Bayer and Pühringer 2019). 
However, the extent to which these strong patterns of ideological and authority bias affect 
economists prescribe policy solutions remains an open question.  
It is well understood that ideological bias could impede the engagement with alternative 
views, narrow the pedagogy, and bias and delineate research parameters. We believe that 
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recognizing their own biases, especially when there exists evidence that suggests they could 
operate through implicit or unconscious modes, is the first step for economists who strive to be 
objective and ideology-free. This is also consistent with the standard to which most economists in 
our study hold themselves. To echo again the words of Alice Rivlin in her 1987 American 
Economic Association presidential address, “economists need to be more careful to sort out, for 
ourselves and others, what we really know from our ideological biases.” 
Another important step to minimize the influence of our ideological biases is to understand 
their roots. As argued by prominent social scientists (e.g. Althusser 1976, Foucault 1969, Popper 
1955, Thompson 1997), the main source of ideological bias is knowledge-based, influenced by the 
institutions that produce discourse. For example, Colander and Klamer (1987) and Colander 
(2005) survey graduate students at top-ranking graduate economic programs in the US and find 
that, according to these students, techniques are the key to success in graduate school, while 
understanding the economy and knowledge about economic literature only help a little. Similarly, 
Rubinstein (2006) suggests that “students who come to us to 'study economics' instead become 
experts in mathematical manipulations.” This lack of depth in knowledge acquired, not only in 
economics but in any discipline or among any group of people, make individuals to lean more 
easily on ideology.  
This highlights the importance of economic training as perhaps the most influential factor 
in shaping ideological views among economists. It affects the way they process information, 
identify problems, and approach these problems in their research. In addition, not surprisingly, this 
training may also affect the policies they favour, and the ideologies they adhere to. As Colandar 
(2005) points out, over time these influences are passed on from one cohort of graduate students 
to the next: “[i]n many ways, the replicator dynamics of graduate school play a larger role in 
determining economists’ methodology and approach than all the myriad papers written about 
methodology.”  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Probability of different agreement levels – By statement 
 
Note: See Table A8 in our online appendix for a complete list of statements and sources. 
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Figure 2: OLS estimates of differences in agreement level between control and treatment 
groups – By statement 
 
Note: Agreement levels is z-normalized for each statement. Control variables include: gender, PhD completion 
cohort, current status, country, research area. Both 90% and 95% confidence intervals are displayed for 
each estimate. The two horizontal lines on each confidence interval band represent where the 90% 
confidence interval ends. 
First (second) listed source for each statement is the actual (altered) source. Bold source for each pair refers to the 
less-/non-mainstream source. See Table A8 in our online appendix for more details. 
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Table 1: OLS Estimates of differences in agreement level between control 
and treatment groups 
A: In Units of Agreement Level (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment 1 (none-/less-mainstream source) -0.264*** -0.261*** -0.262*** -0.268*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Treatment 2 (no source) -0.415*** -0.404*** -0.406***        † 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  
B: In Units of Standard Deviation     
Treatment 1 (none-/less-mainstream source) -0.223*** -0.220*** -0.221*** -0.226*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Treatment 2 (no source) -0.350*** -0.341*** -0.343***        † 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  
     
P-value: Treatment 1 = Treatment 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 NA 
     
Controls No Yes No No 
More Control No No Yes No 
Fixed Person Effects No No No Yes 
     
Number of observations 36375 36375 36375 25185 
Note: Omitted category is receiving a mainstream source. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is agreement level on a scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). For panel (B), the dependent variable 
is standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation of one. The average agreement 
level in our sample is 3.35 with standard deviation of 1.185. Significance levels: *** < 
1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.  
Controls include: gender, PhD completion cohort, current status, country, and research 
area. More Controls include all the previously listed variables as well as age cohort, 
country/region of birth, English proficiency, department of affiliation, and country 
where PhD was completed.  
† We cannot identify the effect of treatment 2 in models with individual fixed effects since 
those who are sorted into treatment 2 receive all statements without a source and therefore 
there is no variation in treatment within a person and across statements. We therefore exclude 
these participants from the fixed effects model. 
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Table 2: Ordered logit estimates of differences in agreement level between control and 
treatment groups  
 Outcome: 
Panel A: Without Controls 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Predicted probability of outcome  0.050*** 0.168*** 0.166*** 0.403*** 0.212*** 
Control Group (mainstream source) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Difference in predicted probability  0.022*** 0.050*** 0.021*** -0.036*** -0.057*** 
mainstream Vs. less-/non-mainstream (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Difference in predicted probability  0.039*** 0.083*** 0.029*** -0.067*** -0.085*** 
mainstream Vs. no source (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
 Outcome: 
Panel B: With Controls 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Predicted probability of outcome  0.048*** 0.166*** 0.169*** 0.411*** 0.206*** 
Control Group (mainstream source) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Difference in predicted probability  0.021*** 0.051*** 0.022*** -0.038*** -0.056*** 
mainstream Vs. less-/non-mainstream (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Difference in predicted probability  0.037*** 0.083*** 0.030*** -0.068*** -0.082*** 
mainstream Vs. no source (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
      
Number of observations 36375 36375 36375 36375 36375 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.  
The dependent variable is agreement level on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
Controls include: gender, PhD completion cohort, current status, country, research area.  
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Table 3: OLS estimates of differences in confidence level  
A: In Units of Confidence Level (1) (2) 
Treatment 1 (none-/less-mainstream source) 0.005 0.008 
 (0.011) (0.010) 
Treatment 2 (no source) -0.019       † 
 (0.012)  
B: In Units of Standard Deviation   
Treatment 1 (none-/less-mainstream source) 0.006 0.009 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
Treatment 2 (no source) -0.020        † 
 (0.013)  
   
P-value: treatment 1 = treatment 2 0.037 NA 
   
Controls Yes No 
Fixed Person Effects No Yes 
   
Number of observations 36088 24984 
Note: Omitted category is Control Group (i.e. mainstream source). 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is confidence level with 
evaluation on a scale from 1 (least confident) to 5 (most 
confident). For panel (B), the dependent variable is standardized 
to have mean zero and standard deviation of one. The average 
confidence level in our sample is 3.93 with standard deviation 
of 0.928. Since confidence level was voluntary to report in our 
survey, compared to agreement level regressions we lose a small 
number of observations were confidence level is not reported.   
Significance levels: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.  
Controls include: gender, PhD completion cohort, current status, 
country, research area.  
† We cannot identify the effect of treatment 2 in fixed effects model 
since those who are sorted into this group receive all statements 
without a source and therefore there is no variation in treatment 
within a person and across statements. We therefore exclude these 
participants from the fixed effects model. 
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Table 4: OLS Estimates of differences in agreement level between 
control and treatment groups – By expertise 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Control group Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Expert -0.002 -0.227*** -0.344*** 
 (0.029) (0.0184) (0.0193) 
Non-Expert  -0.214*** -0.338*** 
  (0.0160) (0.0168) 
    
P-value: equality of coefficients  0.580 0.883 
F-statistic: equality of coefficients  0.30 0.02 
    
Number of observations 36375 
Note: Control group refers to receiving a mainstream source. Treatment 1 refers to 
receiving a less-/non-mainstream source. Treatment 2 refers to receiving no source. 
Omitted category is expert & control group. Expert is an indicator that is equal to 1 
of a participant’s reported area of research is related to the area of an evaluated 
statement and zero otherwise. See Table A10 in the Online Appendix for more details. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is agreement level on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) and is z-normalized. Significance levels: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, 
* < 10%.  
Controls include: PhD completion cohort, current status, country, research area.  
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Table 5: OLS Estimates of differences in agreement level between control and treatment groups – By political orientation 
 Main Results Robustness 1 Robustness 2 
 Author-created categories Categories by quintiles of political orientation Categories by quintiles of adjusted political 
orientation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
 Control group Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Control group Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Control group Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
          
Far Left  -0.046* -0.325***  -0.062*** -0.314***  -0.069*** -0.230*** 
  (0.024) (0.0280)  (0.021) (0.023)  (0.023) (0.024) 
Left -0.241*** -0.229*** -0.330*** -0.164*** -0.229*** -0.269*** -0.130*** -0.217*** -0.402*** 
 (0.0217) (0.018) (0.0189) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) 
Center -0.408*** -0.280*** -0.402*** -0.255*** -0.280*** -0.405*** -0.250*** -0.250*** -0.370*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.0289) (0.0231) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) 
Right -0.564*** -0.319*** -0.337*** -0.379*** -0.282*** -0.408*** -0.370*** -0.261*** -0.368*** 
 (0.028) (0.032) (0.0324) (0.024) (0.027) (0.028) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) 
Far Right -0.607*** -0.358*** -0.388*** -0.555*** -0.325*** -0.352*** -0.594*** -0.331*** -0.361*** 
 (0.046) (0.061) (0.0648) (0.027) (0.031) (0.033) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) 
          
P-value of equality  0.000 0.000 0.236 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F-statistic of equality  70.94 17.27 1.38 66.38 18.43 4.59 113.14 14.87 7.06 
 
# observations 36315 36315 36315 
Note: Control group refers to receiving a mainstream source. Treatment 1 refers to receiving a less-/non-mainstream source. Treatment 2 refers to receiving no source. 
Omitted category is Far Left & control group. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is agreement level on a 
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and is z-normalized. Political orientation is self-reported by participants on a scale from -10 (far left) to 
10 (far right). Significance levels: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%. Controls include: gender, PhD completion co hort, current status, country, research area. 
For Columns (1) to (3), we use self-reported political orientation to group participants into 5 categories: Far left =  [-10 -7], Left = [-6  -2], Centre = [-1  1], 
Right = [2  6], Far Right = [7  10]. Results reported in Columns (4) to (9) are for robustness check. For results reported in columns (4) to (6), we create the five 
political groups using the quintiles of political orientation distribution. For results reported in columns (7) to (9), we create the fiv e political groups using the 
quintiles of the adjusted political orientation distribution. Adjusted political orientation measure is created by running a regression of self-reported political 
orientation on a series of indicators based on questions asked from participants to identify their political typology. See Table A9 in our online appendix for more 
details. 
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Table 6: OLS Estimates of gender differences in agreement level 
between control and treatment groups 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Control group Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Male  -0.244*** -0.338*** 
  (0.013) (0.014) 
Female 0.0633*** -0.137*** -0.353*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0248) (0.027) 
    
P-value: equality of coefficients  0.000 0.638 
F-statistic: equality of coefficients  14.13 0.22 
    
Number of observations 36375 
Note: Control group refers to receiving a mainstream source. Treatment 1 refers to 
receiving a less-/non-mainstream source. Treatment 2 refers to receiving no source. 
Omitted category is male & control group. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is agreement level on a scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and is z-normalized. 
Significance levels: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.  
Controls include: PhD completion cohort, current status, country, research area.  
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Table 7: OLS Estimates of differences in agreement level between 
control and treatment groups – By country 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Control Group Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Australia  -0.325*** -0.536*** 
  (0.055) (0.059) 
Austria -0.201** 0.021 -0.079 
 (0.081) (0.103) (0.101) 
Brazil -0.090 0.017 0.015 
 (0.074) (0.086) (0.108) 
Canada -0.012 -0.282*** -0.396*** 
 (0.045) (0.034) (0.037) 
France 0.195*** -0.217*** -0.358*** 
 (0.047) (0.040) (0.041) 
Germany 0.005 -0.178*** -0.233*** 
 (0.055) (0.060) (0.064) 
Ireland 0.010 -0.440*** -0.428*** 
 (0.112) (0.148) (0.151) 
Italy 0.118** -0.113*** -0.237*** 
 (0.047) (0.038) (0.042) 
Japan 0.037 -0.353*** -0.367*** 
 (0.060) (0.072) (0.072) 
Netherlands -0.087 -0.249*** -0.125* 
 (0.065) (0.076) (0.075) 
New Zealand -0.079 -0.237*** -0.356*** 
 (0.070) (0.082) (0.087) 
Scandinavia 0.004 -0.295*** -0.385*** 
 (0.048) (0.044) (0.048) 
South Africa 0.254*** -0.118 -0.330*** 
 (0.081) (0.107) (0.097) 
Switzerland 0.073 -0.293*** -0.455*** 
 (0.077) (0.099) (0.096) 
UK 0.012 -0.221*** -0.378*** 
 (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) 
US -0.082** -0.214*** -0.349*** 
 (0.040) (0.020) (0.021) 
    
P-value: equality of coefficients 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F-statistic: equality of coefficients 9.07 2.53 3.40 
    
Number of observations 36375 
Note: Control group refers to receiving a mainstream source. Treatment 1 refers to 
receiving a less-/non-mainstream source. Treatment 2 refers to receiving no source. 
Omitted category is Australia & control group. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is agreement level on a 
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and is z-normalized. 
Significance levels: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.  
Controls include: gender, PhD completion cohort, current status, research area.  
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Table 8: OLS Estimates of differences in agreement level between control and 
treatment groups – By country/region where PhD was completed 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Control Group Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Africa  -0.095 -0.280** 
  (0.118) (0.117) 
Asia 0.0230 -0.390*** -0.360*** 
 (0.115) (0.097) (0.091) 
Canada 0.0437 -0.316*** -0.464*** 
 (0.101) (0.045) (0.051) 
Europe 1 (France, Belgium) 0.0966 -0.159*** -0.254*** 
 (0.102) (0.039) (0.040) 
Europe 2 (Germany, Austria, Netherlands, -0.0180 -0.198*** -0.264*** 
Switzerland, Luxembourg) (0.101) (0.042) (0.040) 
Europe 3 (Italy, Spain, Portugal) -0.0148 -0.109** -0.216*** 
 (0.101) (0.045) (0.052) 
Europe 4 (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) 0.0936 -0.300*** -0.444*** 
 (0.103) (0.056) (0.058) 
Europe 5 (UK, Ireland) 0.0351 -0.177*** -0.331*** 
 (0.0992) (0.045) (0.046) 
Not Applicable -0.128 -0.182*** -0.373*** 
 (0.109) (0.043) (0.044) 
Oceania -0.0232 -0.186** -0.329*** 
 (0.110) (0.080) (0.079) 
Other -0.273* -0.095 -0.967*** 
 (0.152) (0.197) (0.227) 
South America 0.133 0.013 -0.041 
 (0.142) (0.113) (0.128) 
United States -0.0578 -0.251*** -0.372*** 
 (0.0957) (0.018) (0.019) 
    
P-value: equality of coefficients 0.000 0.004 0.000 
F-statistic: equality of coefficients 3.48 2.40 3.25 
    
Number of observations 36375 
Note: Control group refers to receiving a mainstream source. Treatment 1 refers to receiving a less-
/non-mainstream source. Treatment 2 refers to receiving no source. Omitted category is Africa & 
control group. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is agreement level on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) 
and is z-normalized. Significance levels: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.  
Controls include: gender, PhD completion cohort, current status, country, research area. 
“Other” category includes Central America , Eastern Europe, Rest of Europe, Middle East, The 
Caribbean. Due to very small cell size for these countries/regions (135 observations in total), 
we have put them all in one category. 
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Table 9: OLS Estimates of differences in agreement level between control and 
treatment groups – By research area  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Control Group Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Teaching  -0.138** -0.398*** 
  (0.060) (0.059) 
History of Thought, Methodology,  0.159*** -0.106** -0.224*** 
     Heterodox Approaches (0.052) (0.047) (0.051) 
Mathematical and Quantitative Methods -0.115** -0.256*** -0.298*** 
 (0.052) (0.046) (0.048) 
Microeconomics -0.161*** -0.229*** -0.379*** 
 (0.050) (0.043) (0.043) 
Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics -0.125*** -0.333*** -0.197*** 
 (0.047) (0.036) (0.037) 
International Economics -0.031 -0.265*** -0.489*** 
 (0.050) (0.044) (0.049) 
Financial Economics -0.143** -0.263*** -0.271*** 
 (0.059) (0.063) (0.060) 
Public Economics -0.088* -0.310*** -0.323*** 
 (0.052) (0.046) (0.049) 
Health, Education, and Welfare 0.027 -0.227*** -0.485*** 
 (0.052) (0.048) (0.055) 
Labor and Demographic Economics -0.028 -0.208*** -0.359*** 
 (0.047) (0.036) (0.039) 
Law and Economics 0.006 -0.237** -0.412*** 
 (0.083) (0.112) (0.122) 
Industrial Organization -0.094* -0.246*** -0.326*** 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.058) 
Economic Development, Innovation,  0.080 -0.152*** -0.504*** 
     Technological Change (0.050) (0.042) (0.044) 
Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics 0.000 -0.167*** -0.363*** 
 (0.050) (0.042) (0.044) 
Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate,  -0.054 -0.124 -0.329*** 
     and Transportation Economics (0.068) (0.078) (0.079) 
Cultural Economics, Economic Sociology,  0.104 -0.071 0.087 
     Economic Anthropology (0.110) (0.160) (0.169) 
Business Administration, Marketing, Accounting 0.290*** -0.223** -0.465*** 
 (0.075) (0.096) (0.112) 
Other -0.002 -0.039 -0.025 
 (0.065) (0.073) (0.072) 
    
P-value: equality of coefficients 0.000 0.004 0.000 
F-statistic: equality of coefficients 7.82 2.12 4.77 
    
Number of observations 36375 
Note: Control group refers to receiving a mainstream source. Treatment 1 refers to receiving a less-/non-
mainstream source. Treatment 2 refers to receiving no source. Omitted category is Teaching & control 
group. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is agreement level on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and is z -
normalized. Significance levels: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.  
Controls include: gender, PhD completion cohort,  current status, country.  
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Table 10: OLS Estimates of differences in agreement level between control and 
treatment groups – By undergraduate major 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Control Group Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Other Social Sciences   -0.062 -0.232* 
(Anthropology, Sociology, Psychology)  (0.104) (0.122) 
Business, Management -0.036 -0.218*** -0.257*** 
 (0.083) (0.049) (0.053) 
Biology, Chemistry, Physics -0.004 -0.141* -0.338*** 
 (0.094) (0.080) (0.087) 
Computer Science, Engineering -0.086 -0.147* -0.386*** 
 (0.095) (0.081) (0.084) 
Earth and space sciences, Geography -0.042 -0.191** -0.430*** 
 (0.095) (0.091) (0.086) 
Economics -0.043 -0.253*** -0.346*** 
 (0.076) (0.015) (0.016) 
History, Language and literature -0.054 0.000 -0.062 
 (0.103) (0.094) (0.095) 
Law 0.064 0.077 -0.071 
 (0.140) (0.180) (0.301) 
Mathematics, Statistics -0.084 -0.155*** -0.274*** 
 (0.082) (0.043) (0.044) 
Philosophy, Political Science, International Affairs 0.090 -0.190*** -0.397*** 
 (0.085) (0.058) (0.065) 
Agricultural/Environmental Sciences -0.050 -0.123 -0.587*** 
 (0.105) (0.101) (0.106) 
Other 0.186 0.153 -0.037 
 (0.141) (0.160) (0.146) 
Not Reported -0.047 -0.220*** -0.419*** 
 (0.082) (0.047) (0.046) 
    
P-value: equality of coefficients 0.083 0.035 0.031 
F-statistic: equality of coefficients 1.70 1.94 1.97 
    
Number of observations 36375 
Note: Control group refers to receiving a mainstream source. Treatment 1 refers to receiving a less-/non-
mainstream source. Treatment 2 refers to receiving no source. Omitted category is Other Social Sciences 
& control group. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is agreement level on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and is z -
normalized. Significance levels: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.  
Controls include: gender, PhD completion cohort, current status, country, research area.  
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Click Here for the Online Appendix 
 
